
I have long championed Barbados as the potential “Luxembourg of the Caribbean”, a well-regulated jurisdiction with real potential to lead Caribbean financial services. As a former financial regulatory lawyer, hedge fund COO and recognised KYC/AML expert, I have spent the last two decades on the same side of the table as the correspondent banks, regulators and institutional partners that Barbadian firms have always had to work with and convince.
Few countries have challenged financial de-risking as forcefully as Barbados. In 2022, its Prime Minister presented the region’s case before the US House Committee on Financial Services (1), pointing to a Caribbean-wide problem: active correspondent banking relationships across Latin America and the Caribbean fell by roughly 40 per cent between 2011 and 2020 (2). Since then, Barbados has been removed from the Financial Action Task Force grey list in 2024 (3) and from the European Union's list of high-risk third countries in 2025 (4). That is a rare and hard-won reversal of the regional trend, and an opening for Barbadian institutions to rebuild access with international counterparties and clients.
But delisting is a milestone, not a finish line, and it arrives as international AML/CFT expectations are becoming more demanding. Financial institutions face growing pressure to not only maintain appropriate policies and controls, but to demonstrate that those measures are applied consistently and work effectively in practice. The cost of getting it wrong keeps climbing regardless of a jurisdiction's status. Global regulators issued an estimated $3.8 billion in AML, KYC and sanctions penalties in 2025, following $4.6 billion in 2024 and $6.6 billion in 2023 (5), three consecutive multi-billion-dollar years. Enforcement is not easing off, it is spreading, and coming off a watchlist reduces reputational risk, but it does little to reduce remaining regulatory risk, which keeps rising in many places with new financial instruments and AI.
International banks are therefore likely to subject individual Barbadian institutions and professional services firms to the same rigorous scrutiny, examining the strength of their controls, the quality of their customer due diligence, and the evidence that these measures work in practice. Restoring correspondent relationships as well as international access will depend on each institution or company being able to make that progress visible.
What this means for banks and professional firms
Delisting removes a red flag but the need to prove a firm can manage its risk remains, as correspondent banks or clients carry real regulatory and reputational exposure of their own every time they open a channel or an account or are subjected to more checks just because they have a link to a Barbados based company or bank. Giving access to US dollar clearing or cross-border payments is a must for the industry to thrive and lowering any impression of exposure to that correspondent's customers and transactions is a must. The workflow needs to provide confidence that the correspondent knows who it is dealing with, understands the risks, and can show how those risks are controlled.
For smaller banks, or professional firms that scrutiny is more direct, a correspondent or associated financial institution will examine ownership, management, risk profile and anti-money-laundering controls, often through the Wolfsberg questionnaire (6). The Central Bank of Barbados expects due diligence to cover the same core areas (7). Weak or incomplete evidence makes the relationship harder to approve, more expensive to maintain, and easier to exit. This is totally unfair to business which needs reliability and where the threat of a compliance cut off can come very easily and not always justifiably. Consider the Swiss banks which cut off working with the Caribbean after their own failings in the USA (8).
The same principle applies whether banking, law firms, corporate services providers, real estate, jewellers and trust companies to name a few. They need to show who they act for, how ownership was established, what risks were identified, and what was done about them within their own risk tolerance.
The key point:
Delisting creates the opportunity, but perseverance towards credible evidence will determine which institutions can turn it into renewed trust and access and as a whole whether Barbados can gain the industry growth it deserves.
The real cost of a weak file
The firm did the work, but the verification sits in one officer's inbox, the risk rating lives in a spreadsheet, and the approval was given in a conversation that was never documented. A reviewer can only give credit for what the file demonstrates, and where the evidence is incomplete or difficult to retrieve, the firm becomes harder to bank or partner with, and harder to recommend.
A correspondent bank, regulator or institutional partner will typically expect to see verified ownership and control information, a documented risk assessment and the reasoning behind it, source-of-funds or source-of-wealth evidence where required, screening results with explanations of how any alerts were resolved, a complete approval and review history, and a clearly scheduled next review date. This is well known but with the pace of business it’s slow sometimes too time consuming and therefore missed.



-9.jpg)


